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PENOLOGY AND CORPORATE CRIME
LEO DAVIDS
The author, who received his M.A. at the City College of New York in 1961, is Lecturer in Sociol-
ogy at Hunter College. He has taught Criminology and juvenile Delinquency at various campuses of
The City University of New York, and has also published in the area of Family Problems. He is cur-
rently preparing his doctoral dissertation at New York University.
Mr. Davids' article considers crime by major corporations in the light of the penal sanctions now
available to control it. Statistical data and case-history information are joined with sociological analy-
ses to support the thesis that present law is inadequate to cope with problems of commercial crime.
Suggestions for a realignment of the pertinent legislation with current realities in this field are pre-
sented.
The principal business of penology is neither an
historical task of discovering what societal reac-
tions to crime have been in various times and
places, nor the providing of systematic details of
prison administration, but rather the evaluation of
what happens after conviction in terms of prevent-
ing recurrence of the same acts.1 The main criterion
by which we can judge our "sanction law", as
Arens and Lasswell discuss it,2 is whether society
tends to be safer after its application than before.
By such a test, clearly, much of our present system
of justice in the United States is a disturbing and
costly failure.
There is no need for a discussion of ordinary,
individual crimes and the deterrent effect of the
usual penalties that our courts prescribe; this has
been abundantly done by other writers. What is to
be examined here is corporate crime in relation
to the societal apparatus intended to control it.
It will become clear that there is a pronounced
discrepancy, a sort of cultural lag separating
the ongoing reality of illegal activities by orga-
nized human associations from the laws and pro-
cedures now institutionalized against those activ-
ities.
Before we can look at this penal lag, a number of
definitions and distinctions are in order. We must
focus on our topic by pointing out the things that
we shall not be looking at, as well as making sure
that the units in which we deal are specifically
understood. Let us begin with the obviously-
appropriate concept of "white collar crime".
Although libraries may place together the well-
' Cf. SUTHERILAND & CRESSEY, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMI-
NoLooy 259--60 (5th ed. 1955).
2 ARENS & LASSWELL, IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC ORDER
(THE EMERGING FIELD OF SANCTION LAW) (1961).
known treatises of Sutherland, Clinard, Jaspan,
and Cressey,3 we find that they cover a number of
different things. It is Sutherland's classic, which
deals mainly with illegal acts by corporations
against external entities (other corporations, the
government or the general public) that is relevant
here. We will only tangentially be concerned with
crimes against the corporation by its own person-
nel, or with individual crimes which are of a routine
business character and are folk-legitimized by the
great principle "Everybody's doing it". These
other categories will be dealt with here only as they
contribute to our consideration of corporate crime
in Sutherland's sense.
It should be clear that our approach herein is
sociological as well as legal, so that our material
will be channelled both by social science concep-
tions and by jurisprudential ones. Hence, we will
not restrict ourselves, again following the lead of
Sutherland and others, to officially-designated
crimes dealt with by criminal tribunals, but shall
also look at actions penalized or prevented by civil
and administrative action.4
NATURE OF TIIE CORPORATION
Let us see why Wilbert E. Moore calls the cor-
poration "that singular organization". 5 A cor-
poration is the result of the creation of a new "legal
'SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CanIE (1949);
CriNARD, THE BLACK MARKET (1952); JAsPAN &
BLACK, THE THIEF IN THE WHITE COLLAR (1960);
CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY (1953).
4 The procedural systems are often interchangeable.
See Cressey's "Foreword" to WHrTE COLLAR CRIME,
op. cit. supra pp. iv-ix.
-M OORE, THE CoNDucT OF THE CORPORATION vii
(1962). He and we are speaking of large business firms,
not of family stores or non-profit organizations.
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TABLE I
REPRESENTATIVE MAGNITUDE DATA or FOUR MAJOR AmERCAN CoRPoRATIoNs (as of Dec. 31, 1965)
Name
Amer. Tel. & Tel. Con. Edison Gen. Motors Gulf Oil Corp.
Output units 75,866,254 tele- 4,367,020 meters in 7,278,131 vehicles 2,082,121 bbl. daily
phones in service I service sold in 1965 average
Employees 795,294 23,863 734,600 55,200
Total assets $32,818,689,000 $3,387,006,500 $11,478,546,590 $5,210,833,000
Gross revenue $11,061,783,000 $ 840,240,274, $20,733,982,295 $4,185,253,000
1965 
2
Percentage in- 40% 28% 63% 32%
crease of gross ($7,920,454,000) ($655,812,826) -($12,735,999,681) ($3,212,205,000)
revenue since1960 1
Source .Annual Report, Annual Report, Annual Report, Annual Report dated
dated Feb. 16 dated Feb. 23, dated Feb. 14 March 16 '66 pp. 2,
1966 pp. 25-28 1966 pp. 26-31 1966 pp. 28, 36-37 34-35
(Percentage of Increase figures computed by author.)
person", somehow independent of its founders, who
obtained the necessary charter. The corporation
often outlives its founders, and the British "lim-
ited" shouts the fact that its obligations and those
of the men involved in it are two separate things.
The historical-legal article by Laski shows how
uncertain the Anglo-American law was about the
exact status of corporations until recently, and in
other sources we also find how perplexing is the
tracing of financial or criminal liability in dealing
with such collectivities.' It is nowadays recognized
that corporations do accomplish meaningful acts
that cannot be attributed to any individual man
but have to be laid at the organization's door.
As Weber and other analysts of bureaucracy
have taught us, bureaucratized corporations pos-
sess various structural advantages. Among these
strengths is the superior scope and power of the
fused thinking of many people who are experienced
and competent to deal with a limited range of
recurrent problems, and whose rational decisions
are promptly and thoroughly translated into
action. This means that a board of directors, or
other legitimate groups constitutive of the cor-
poration, can arrive at decisions which neither
could have been thought through as thoroughly by
the individuals involved, separately, nor serve their
6 Laski, The Personality of Associations originally in
29 HARv. L. Rnv. 404, reprinted as selection 21 in
HENSON (Ed.), LANDMARKs or LAw 321-38 (1960). See,
also, INBAU & Sowim, CRnMNAL JusTicE 486-92 (2d ed.
1964); and MOORE, op. cit. supra note 5 at 53-6 and
86-7.
individual interests. This thinking and deciding can
only be dealt with and traced into effects and
repercussions on the collective level.7
Another structural strength, as we have noted,
is the existence of a transitive-executive corps that,
once informed of the authorized will of the cor-
poration's thinking parts (management), puts these
into effect without independent questioning and
evaluation of the decision. Obviously this is so, and
must be; what emerges, however, is an issue of
responsibility/culpability identical to that so
highly publicized by defense counsel at the Nurem-
berg trials.
A quite different virtue-turnable-into-vice of the
corporation is the great volume of work in its
specialty that it can accomplish. Through extensive
division of labor and careful management to co-
ordinate its various branches, the corporation is
able to produce and distribute staggering quanti-
ties of goods and services. For some actual data on
corporate magnitude, we need but select a few
figures from the latest annual reports of our major
corporations. If we settle for slightly older sta-
tistics, we can use Fortune's Annual Directory of
the largest corporations.
In 1964 the United States had 55 industrial
corporations with over $1 billion of annual sales.
The rest of the world had 21 such firms. The top
500 U.S. manufacturers totaled 10,464,383 em-
See ETzloNI, MODERN ORGANIzATIONs 29-30, 51-
55 (1964); HunrF, SOcIAL AsPEcTs or ENTERPRISE IN
TUiE LARGE CORPORATION 100-104 (1950).
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ployees, an average of some 21,000 people each.
There were also 25 insurance companies and 40
commercial banks in the U. S. with assets exceeding
$1 billion. Furthermore, hefty percentage increases
in sales and profits were registered by every manu-
facturing industry except Tobacco.8
One of the central consequences of the foregoing
magnitudes is the substantive nullity of little
disturbances or added cost in management deci-
sions, since they can be entirely ignored when
increases of overhead can be subdivided onto the
selling price of millions or billions of product-units.
As we shall see, the category of negligible little
disturbances includes litigation and fines for most
commercial crimes; on this scale of business, such
deterrents become invisible.
THE UNDERLYING PERSONAL CLIMATE
There is more to the etiology of corporate offen-
ses than internal structure and scope, however.
Many portraitists of American life and value
including Robin M. Williams, Robert C. Angell,
and criminologists like M. B. Clinard or W. C.
Reckless, have shown the inevitable correlation of
dominant U. S. goals and norms with the long-term
currents of ethical and moral change and with the
tenor of commercial-industrial activity.9 All of
these things are seen as similar expressions of a
single modem philosophy of life, shaped by urbani-
zation, high mobility, a deep-rooted pragmatism,
rationalization-and alienation.
It is not our task to review such analyses here,
but again we find individual acts understandable in
the context of, and as manifestations of, socio-
cultural forces and conditions to which those who
plan our institutions should be alert. Clinard
summarizes:
It has been said that as urbanism has in-
creased, as man's behavior has become more
individual, competitive, and materialistic,
and as his conformity to social norms has
become less affected by informal group con-
trols, greater opportunities and inducements
8 FORTUNE MAGAZINE 149-68 (July 1965); 169-80
(Aug. 1965). Private corporations which do not issue
stockholder reports, are not included, so that the total
are less than they would be with fuller information.
9WIIuAms, AERsucAN SOCIETY 372-96, 417-21
(2nd Ed. 1960); ANGELL, FREE SOCIETY AND MORAL
CRIsis 133-35 (1965); CrINARD, SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANT
BEHAVIOR 168-74 (1963); REc~a.ss, CPaiN PROBLEm
1-2, 335-41 (1961).
appear to develop for behavior which devi-
ates from accepted norms. 0
Descending from the cultural to the psycho-
logical level, we can find the same trends charac-
terizing contemporary American life expressed not
as summary comments on the value system, but
an terms of The Organization Man or the "other-
directed" rat-racers of so many recent critics;"
Cressey has woven this theme into his study of
embezzlement.12 These writerg have shown the
impact of modem, and especially big, business on
personality. The late Senator Kefauver wrote!
There is also some evidence that long service
in an industry creates a distinctive kind of
executive. As the officials of the leading cor-
porations in an industry parade through a
Congressional hearing room, they often seem
to have been constructed from the same mold.
Sometimes this similarity is not confined to
the rather uniform way they view the in-
dustry's problems... On occasion it extends
to general physical appearance, pattern of
dress, and even sense of humor.. 13
While this thought is well expressed here, it is,
of course, not new. Many social scientists, some-
times harking back to the remarkable insights of
De Tocqueville, or to the biting, flaying descrip-
tions of Thorstein Veblen, have documented
the appearance in corporate personnel of numer-
ous character degenerations. Robert K. Merton sug-
gested some of the problems engendered by struc-
tures which pressure individuals into ritualism or
innovative solutions, and thinking along this line
has been developed by others.14 The upshot of
these analyses is that the deeds of people in com-
as CLnxARU, op. cit. supra note 9 at 76. Also see
QUINN, THE INDIVIDUAL IN A Busnrass SociETY 12
(1958) for vehement remarks on Our Machine Civiliza-
tion, in which "life is being trivialized and emptied of
meaning".
"The first is by WHr (1956); Other Direction is
from REismAN, GLAZER & DENNEY, THE LONELY
CROWD (1950).
OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY, op. cit. supra note 3,
combines individual factors with the invaluable rational-
izations (what Sykes & Matza call techniques of neu-
tralization) that are group-transmitted. See, for in-
stance, 93-98. For a popular discussion, cf. GrNEY,
THE OPERATORS 252-75 (1960).
1KEFAUVER & TILL, IN A FEw HANDs 123-24
(1965). Also, ETzIoNi, op. cit. supra note 7, at 109-10.
I4 MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY & SOCIAL STRUCTURE
132, 140-46, 176-81 (Revised ed. 1957); VEBLEN is
quoted at 141. We later refer to Kemper's article Repre-
sentative Roles and the Legitimation of Deviance, which
is in this tradition of structural analysis.
[Vol. 58
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plex organizations struggling in a competitive,
profit-making situation are neither accidental nor
unpredictable, but emanate naturally from the
functional situation and should be taken into
account by decision makers, whether in manage-
ment or government."5
SuBsTANTrvE Aces AND PENALTIES
We now turn to specific business crimes that we
can use in exploring legal lag, with the penalties
whose sufficiency we will contest. Following Suth-
erland, the major areas of corporate offense are:
restraint of trade; infringement of patents, trade-
marks, or copyrights; advertising misrepresenta-
tion; unfair labor practices; and financial manipula-
tions. By inspection, these cover victimization of
other firms, of creative individuals or competitors,
of the general public, a company's own employees,
or stockholders.16 Obviously, Sutherland has found
considerable evidence of wrongful behavior vis-&-
vis every general category interacting with the
corporation considered as an integral entity.
Since capital punishment is ruled out in the
type of crime under consideration here (excepting
that dissolution is sometimes authorized against
combination in restraint of trade-which is the
exact functional equivalent of execution for indi-
viduals), the only penalties to consider are impris-
onment, (civil) damages, or (criminal) fines. Al-
though an examination of the United States Code
will show maximum terms of three or five years
assignable for certain business crimes, I would
argue that the imprisonment provisions of these
statutes are mainly irrelevant for our purposes.
The scarcity of well-paid and well-connected
gentlemen in prisons is sufficiently known not to
require much documentation here;17 suffice it to
say that large corporations will never allow an
executive of theirs to go to jail without the most
strenuous efforts by well-organized teams of the
best available lawyers, whether house counsel or
firms retained for the emergency. Very few corpor-
ate decision-makers, in fact, go to jail even when
the company is found guilty.8
'5 Compare this to the conclusion reached by Goff-
man in his Asyxums 124 (1961).
16 WMTE COLAR CanRE, op. cit. supra note 3, at
xv, 22.17Ibid. 8; REeLxEss, op. cit. supra note 9, at 34-6.
1 See Increasing Community Control over Corporate
Crime--A Problem in the Law of Sanctions, 71 YAx
LAw JOUMNAL 280-306, 290-93 (1961). We refer to this
key article repeatedly herein. Note that the use of in-
This empirical fact, however, is overshadowed
by some theoretical considerations. Imprisoning
particular individuals whose malfeasance involved
the participation of the collectivity in which they
formed but a small part appears very inequitable
and therefore discourages the imposition of punish-
ment by judges and juries imbued with Anglo-
American concepts of fair play.' 9 Then, too, the
malfeasants who may be found guilty and punished
are promptly replaced by others who will, sooner or
later (depending upon how long "the heat" lasts),
carry on "business as usual".
Unless there is a definite change either in the
structure of the organization or in the relevant
conditions under which it must operate, even the
imprisonment of a considerable number of execu-
tives is highly unlikely to stop permanently
those acts which caused the furor. We remain,
therefore, with the type of legal sanction that is
frequent and meaningful in speaking of corporate
penology: fines and damage awards. In general, and
that is the way we use the terms herein, "fine"
,implies the outcome of criminal litigation with a
finding of "guilty"; "damages" implies a restitutive
or compensatory payment between private parties
as the consequence of a non-stigmatizing civil
action.
To dispose of the weaker deterrent first, we
cannot say much about damage awards, which
depend in each case on the magnitude of the tort
discovered by the court. Only when the actual loss
has been determined can punitive damages be
assessed. Of importance here is- the statutory provi-
sion for treble damages, which is intended-despite
the absence of an official finding that culpable
immorality has occurred and that penalty should
be imposed-to discourage future torts of the same
kind. For example, treble damages may be exacted
for anti-trust violations or patent infringement. 0
But instead of exposing themselves to such suits
by a plea or finding of "guilty", companies regu-
larly plea nolo contendere, which is no evidence
carceration for business crimes is expected to increase,
according to Whiting, Criminal Antitrust Liability of
Corporate Representatives, 51 Ky. L. J. 434, 474 (1963).
19 Cf. MooRE, op. cit. supra-note 5 at 86-7, 144-6, on
Moral Dilemmas built into the situation. Also, ARENs
& LAsswELL, op. cit. supra note 2 at 121-2.
20 See Standing to Sue for Treble Damages under Sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act, an editorial note (with the
F. T. c. symposium in) 64 COL. L. R. 570; the 18 pages
show how difficult it is to exercise one's right to restitu-





REPRESENTATIVE MAXIMUM PENALTIES FOR BUSINESS CRIMES IN FEDERAL LAW
i
Offense Fines up to: Title & Section ofU.S. Code
Conspiracy or combination in restraint of trade ................ $50,000.00 15, sec. 1
Restricting or monopolizing import trade ...................... j $ 5,000.00 15, sec. 8
Rebates or discounts to destroy competition .................. S 5,000.00 15, sec. 13a
Refusing information or falsifying records against F. T. C ....... $ 5,000.00 15, sec. 50
False advertisement ...................................... $10,000.00 15, sec. 54
Copyright Infringement (for profit) .................... ...... S 1,000.00 17, sec. 104
Food adulteration or misbranding
first offense ............................................. $ 1,000.00 21, sec. 333
repeated offense ......................................... $10,000.00 21, sec. 333
Violating licensing restrictions for drug mfrs ................... $ 510,000.00 21, sec. 515
Purposely impeding the NLRB ................................ . S 5,000.00 29, sec. 162
Collusion between union leaders and management ........ $10,000.00 29, sec. 186
Mismanagement or concealing information on workers' benefit 1
funds ..... .......................................... I 1,000.00 29, sec. 308
supporting damage actions on the basis of the
questionable practices. Therefore, the injured
parties can rarely prevail against the powerful
lawyers of the offending corporation. We conclude
our consideration of damages as deterrents to
commercial wrongdoing by observing that the
principle is substantively rational, but its effect is
undermined by the unpredictability of the eventual
cost of an unethical policy.st
We now turn to look at the fines that may be
imposed for various white-collar crimes, being
especially interested in the amounts specified as
maximum penalties. Table II provides a convenient
overview of this.
If we now compare the figures in Table I with
those in Table II, leaving aside difficulties of
formal proof, the latitude of judicial discretion, the
inventiveness and agility of defense counsel, and
other mitigating factors, we are struck by the com-
plete insignificance of the available maximum pen-
alties to companies of the first rank. The top
penalty is the $50,000 one-a maximum set in 1955,
but such a raise does not make much difference.
With every passing year, the large corporations-
those whose wrongdoings can have the most wide-
spread effects on the economy and which set the
pattern for lesser firms22-are more and more liber-
ated from the Lilliputian restraints of law by their
flourishing growth.
We cannot forget the real impact of procedural
21 Cf. YALE LAw JOURNAL, supra note 18 at 290, 2.96.
2 On price leadership see KEFAUVER, op. cit. supra
note 13 at 118-21.
circumstances in evaluating the figures of Table II.
With the aid of top-quality house counsel, nation-
ally-respected law firms, and invaluable personal
contact with leading members of the federal
legislature and bench, corporations can make it so
difficult for the Justice Department to exact even
those tokens of victory, that the Government will
decide to settle the case and seek more fruitful use
of its scarce legal resources elsewhere.
Let us see how General Motors views the situa-
tion. In the Annual Report for 1965--cited above
in Table I-we find a paragraph reading as follows:
Contingent Liabilities:
There are various claims against the corpora-
tion and its consolidated subsidiaries in re-
spect to sundry taxes, suits, patent infringe-
ments and other matters incident to the
ordinary course of business, together with
other contingencies. While there is no way of
determining the eventual liability for these
claims and contingencies, the amount included
in liabilities and reserves in the financial state-
ments of the Corporation and its consoli-
dated subsidies are, in the opinion of the
management (and General Counsel with re-
spect to certain suits), adequate to cover all
settlements that may be made.U
Here, therefore, is a clear-cut case of Ogburn's
cultural lag manifested in the law. Unless there is
a radical adaptation of the sanctions for business
23 Verbatim from Notes to Finamial Statements 32.
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crimes to current reality, those sanctions will not
be able to perform the job that Congress intended
when it passed the historic Sherman and Clayton
Acts to prevent large-scale economic injury to the
public. Just so with the control of other offenses.
ETIOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
From a theoretical point of view, Kemper 24
provides a link between Jaspan's Thief, who en-
riches himself at the expense of his employer, and
the white collar criminal we are discussing.24 Under
the concept of "Parallel deviance", Kemper explains
that employees find legitimation for the small
larcenies they intend to commit in the large ones
(contra Government or public) that their superiors
constantly commit.25Although there be a floating
mythology among the workers to rationalize their
depredations (which are commonly listed as
"shrinkage"), 8 it is to be expected that public
revelation of large-scale wrongdoing above them
will erase any feelings of guilt, or restraints on
amount, that they might still harbor from Sunday
school days.
There is a large area in the psychology of crime
and punishment, moreover, which does not apply
to corporate crime. As jurisprudential theorists
have indicated, a criminal conviction even for
minor offenses means that the individual has been
identified by society as deficient in feelings of
justice and fair play that presumably every
citizen possesses. The formal condemnation of
'society, the moral opprobrium of conviction, may
deter far more than the $25 exacted as penalty?
It is perhaps this painful societal repudiation that
Anglo-American law provides so many safeguards
against-in its presumption of innocence for each
defendant and in the many procedural limitations
hindering the prosecution-rather than the fine
itself.
All of this, however, is inapplicable when we deal
with a corporation, as various writers point out.
Neither is there a specific, visible defendant to
stand shamefacedly before the awesome judge who
is issuing a verdict on his character and fitness to
live in society, nor are the procedural safeguards
24 Aemper, Representative Roles and the Legitimation
of De-tiance, 13 SoC. PROBLEMS 288-98 (1966).
21 Ibid. 295-97.
26 GIBEY, op. cit. supra, note 12 at 3-4; _MooRE, op.
cit. supra note 5 at 160-61.
2 Whiting, op. cit. supra 18, at 447; also Hart, The
Aims of the Criminal Law in 23 LAw & Co.-mxs.
PROBL. 401 (1958), 405. See his discussion of why U. S.
law is not prepared to cope with corporate crime,
422-23.
which ensure fair play to the individual, with his
limited resources, very necessary when the defend-
ant commands more legal talent and financial
resources than the prosecution office.n Once again,
historic-minded thinking which tries to handle the
corporation as if it were an ordinary person is
completely disaligned from the contemporary situa-
tion.
Someone might argue, however, that the era
of "robber barons" and "muckraking" is long gone.
These things cannot be much of a problem cur-
rently with today's enlightened business manage-
ment! The Nader scandal and strong rumblings
from F. D., A. Commissioner Goddard29 are strong
evidence that Sutherland's work is far from ob-
solete, and that we certainly have not solved these
problems.
PREVENTION AN CONTROL
What remains is to consider some of the ways by
which this lag might be cut down, without sub-
stantive inequities due to emotionalism and right-
eous zeal. Given that the penalties must be revised,
the procedures updated0 , and perhaps the very
substance of the legal codes thought through and
restated3 , in what directions should we head?
There are, as an analysis of the authors we have
consulted shows, four principal strategies to control
white collar crime. First is the internal, private-law
method, which involves better "housekeeping" by
management in each firm; second, the individual-
istic, psycho-moral approach, seeking to reduce
deviance at the personnel level; third, the struc-
tural and preventive, involving social engineering
to avoid collective crime; and fourth, the deterrent
and punitive, showing how the penalties could be
made to really hurt.
2 SUTHERLAND, WrTE CoLLAR CRnss 43-4, 227,
232. AR.ENS & LAsswEL, op. cit. supra note 2, at 122,
202-3. See, also, HELLER, THnE SixT A mNDIENT 10,
21-3, 142 (1951) on the relativity of procedural rights
to historical circumstances.
29 On the attempt by G.M. "to ruin" Ralph Nader,
see The Spies Who Were Caught Cold, TIME 79 (Apr. 1,
1966). On charges against drug manufacturers (who
are old villains according to KEFAuVER, op. cit. supra
note 13 at 8-75), see F.D.A. Head Bids Drug Makers
Act 1, 24 in N. Y.Times (Apr. 7, 1966). A condensed
text of his speech to the industry, at its Annual Meet-
ing, is on p. 24, as above, and makes interesting reading.
'30 As HELLER contends, op. cit. supra note 28, at
150-1.
31 As the American Law Institute and American Bar
Association are doing with their model acts, to which
we shall refer shortly. Also see, for instance, ,Model Law
on Trademark, Trade Names and Unfair Compe-
tition, International Chamber of Commerce (1960).
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Jaspan and Moore give practical suggestions
from the standpoint of good management tech-
niques, and their ideas are relevant if corporations
set out to clean their own houses.Y2 The scope of
this essay, understandably, does not permit more
than a summary indication of the various ap-
proaches; details can be found through the citation
of the sources in our footnotes. These authors
correctly observe that private sanctions must be
added to legal ones, since the latter do not succeed
alone. Although there is nothing startlingly new in
their recommendations, this method may well, in
practice, achieve the most substantial results.
Clinard and Kemper view the problem as rooted
in value dysfunctions, and discuss ways of increas-
ing consensus and norm perception by developing
codes of ethics, etc.P Quinn and Kefauver de-
manded Government action, with some interesting
thoughts on publicity, checks and balances, and
structural devices to prevent corporate offenses.3
This approach certainly requires professional sci-
entific attention (from sociologists, economists and
political scientists) to produce realistic programs
from these admirable but hazy proposals.
In the area of effective punishment, however, we
have a number of incisive and sound proposals.
Fines, to start with the simplest remedy, should be
fixed not by absolute sum but proportionally, so
that a certain percentage of capital, annual rev-
2 JAsPAN & BLcn, THE THIEF IN THE WHIrE
COLLAR 233-54 (1960); MOORE, CONDUCT OF TUE
CORPORATION 53-6 (1962).
3 SocIoLoGY oF DEVIAr BEHAVIoR, 598-600;
Representative Roles, op. cit. supra note 10 at 297-98.
Kemper's analysis of deviance being unconsciously
legitimated (for the workers) by executives leads
naturally to his suggestions regarding honest disclosure
and the rectification of differential reward. Clinard, in
an older criminological tradition, seeks to make right
and wrong more explicit by professional association
self-policing and public education against acquiescence
in criminogenic thinking. This is what is predominantly
implied in Gibney's book.
3 THE INDIvIDUAL IN A BUsnEss SOcIETY, op. Cit.
supra note 10 at 63-65, 74-78. Kefauver's proposals are
less emotional; op. cit. supra note 13 at 196-98, 207-17
for his discussion of regulatory powers, better person-
nel, and data for Federal "Watchdog" agencies, and an
informed electorate. He admits weaknesses in this
approach, 209; the dysfunctions of bureaucracy also
affect those intended to control other, bad bureauc-
racies. The effectiveness of government regulation is
strongly challenged in the F. T. c. Anniversary Issue of
the CoLum IA LAw lzvIEw, Vol. 64 (March 1964):
Rowe, The F. T. C.'s Administration of the Anti-Price
Discrimination Law, 415-38; and Blair, Planning for
Competition 524-42. They complain that the actual
consequences of P. T. c. action have been opposite to
the pro-competition intentions of Congress, since busi-
ness concentration and monopoly have not been halted.
enue, or any other criterion of size would be ex-
acted, or one could establish a series of penalty
brackets in a manner analogous to the progressive
income tax.35 The civil suit for damages, which
under present rules is laden with uncertainties and
difficulties, could be superseded by the Govern-
ment's being empowered, upon proof of the alleged
malfeasance to collect all of the ill-gotten gains
that the offending company had achieved through
the crime, with the particular injured parties
recovering single damages out of the fund thus
established in government hands. The residue after
all claims had been settled would not remain with
the malefactors, as it generally does today, but
would be absorbed after a reasonable wait by the
public treasury, thus rightfully contributing in
some measure to the welfare of those who had been
wronged."6 Much greater use of dissolution decrees
(i.e., corporate capital punishment) for recidivists
is also suggested by the American Law Institute.Y7
So far as the culpability of corporate excutives
for the wrongdoings of their subordinates is con-
cerned-which has elicited a number of thoughtful
articles in recent yearsS--the suggestion is made
that the law should impose a responsibility of
supervision on top management (as is done by
child welfare statutes, etc.) so that they would be
held liable not directly for the acts of their subor-
dinates but for the misdemeanor of remaining in
ignorance about their activities should these prove
to have been unlawful.39 Again, there is a clear need
35 YA. L. J., op. cit. sura note 18 at 295; Model
Business Corporation Act, prepared by the Committee
on Corporate Laws A., B. A., Philadelphia: Joint Com-
mittee on Continual Legal Education of the American
Law Institute and American Bar Association, sec. 128(Penalties Imposed Upon Corporations), 115. Other
penalties may be devised along the same line; one that
I have not seen is to prohibit advertising by the offender
during a specified period. In a competitive situation,
this will be felt as a very severe penalty and is easily
checked on.
36 YALE L. J., supra note 18 at 298-301.
37 Both in the Model Business Corporation Act, ibid.,
sec. 87-98 on Involuntary Dissolution, pp. 83-90 and
in the Model Penal Code, Proposed Official Draft, Phila-
delphia: American Law Institute (July 30, 1962), sec.
6.04, 94-95. This, like some other crippling penalties,
could be imposed in a competitive situation, but with
public utilities-where the danger exists of leaving the
public bereft of service-the law would have to direct
its wrath at the guilty individual officers (unless an-
other company could take over the franchise immedi-
ately).
38 WHITING, op. cit. supra note 18; FORTE in 40 IND.
L. J. 313 (1965); 10 ST. Louis U. L. J. 10 (1965). Cf.
Model Penal Code, sec. 2.07, 35-8.
39 YAlE L. J., supra note 18 at 304-06.
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for legislators to investigate these suggestions and
put into practice those of them which can function-
ally succeed, but do no one an injustice.
In summation, we have shown a lack of con-
gruence between two institutional spheres-big
business and commercial/criminal law-that are
supposed to maintain an effective functional
relationship, with continuing importance for
criminology and jurisprudence. Just in recent
months we have again found the drug and auto
Statement of Ownership, Management and Circulation required
by the Act of October 23, 1962; Section 4369, Title 39, United
States Code.
1. Date of Filing: October 1, 1967.
2. Title of Publication: Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology
& Police Science.
3. Frequency of Iss: Quarterly.
4. Location of known Office of Publication: 428 E. Preston St.,
Baltimore, Bid. 21202.
5. Location of the Headquarters or General Business Offices of
Publisher: 428 E. Preston St., Baltimore, Md. 21202.
6. Publisher: The Williams & Wilkins Company, 428 E. Preston
St., Baltimore, Md. 21202.
Editor: Fred E. Inbau, Northwestern University, Chi-
cago, Ill. 60611.
7. Owners: (If owned by a corporation, its name and address
must be stated and also immediately thereunder the names and
addresses of stockholders owning or holding 1 percent or more
of total amount of stock. If not owned by a corporation, the names
and addresses of the individual owners must be given. If owned
by a partnership or other unincorporated firm, its name and
address, as wel as that of each individual, must be given.) North-
western University School of Law, 3857 E. Chicago Ave., Chicago,
Ill. 60611. No stockholders.
8. Known bondholders, mortgagees and other security holders
owning or holding I percent or more of total amount of bonds, mort-
gages or other securities are: None.
9. Paragraphs 7 and 8 include, in cases where the stockholder
or security holder appears upon the books of the company as
trustee or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the person
or corporation for whom such trustee is acting, also the state-
industries under heavy fire from private and
public critics, and the deleterious consequences
of irresponsibility in such areas of business, ob-
viously, may extend far beyond monetary injury.
It has become clear that not only are the amounts
of currently authorized penalties hopelessly in-
adequate to punish infractions by large corpora-
tions, but that the realities of corporate life and
operations today demand a basic re-thinking in
the areas of social control and legal responsibility.
ment in the two paragraphs show the affant's full knowledge
and belief as to the circumstances and conditions under which
stockholders and security holders who do not appear upon the
books of the company as trustees, hold stock and securities in a
capacity other than that of a bona fide owner. Names and ad-
dresses of individuals who are stockholders of a corporation which
itself is a stockholder or holder of bonds, mortgages or other
securities of the publishing corporation have been included in
Paragraphs 7 and 8 when the interests of such individuals are
equivalent to 1 percent or more of the total amount of the stock
or securities of the publishing corporation. (a)* (b)t
10. A. Total No. Copies Printed (Net Press
IRun) ................................... 5988 4985
B. Paid Circulation
1. To term subscribers by mail, carrier
delivery or by other means .......... 3410 3501
2. Sales through agents, news dealers or
otherwise ............................- -
C. Free Distribution (including samples),
by mail, carrier delivery or by other
means .................................. 90 79
D. Total No. of copies distributed ......... 3500 35S0
*Average no. of copies for each issue during preceding 12
months.
t Single issue nearest to filing date.
I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and
complete. Mary G. Maclsaac, Publisher.
